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tests several propositions regarding policy and income inequality.  It concludes,
among other things, that one of the most significant developments over the past
twenty years has been the declining wage paid to those in the manufacturing
export sector.  As a consequence, policies aimed at increasing developing states
participation in the internationalization of production have been less helpful than
supposed.
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1This paper is an extension of Harvey and Klopfenstein 2001.  For comparison, the model
in the earlier paper included twenty variables, while the current one has forty-two.  In addition,
due to space constraints, the earlier paper made no effort to explain the process by which the
parameter estimates were made, and thus none of the regression results were reported.
Capital Flows and Trade in Mexico: A Model of Institutional Dynamics
1
The proper role of portfolio capital in the development process is the subject of vigorous
debate.  One of the core elements of the disagreement is whether or not unregulated financial
markets represent a more efficient means of allocating capital (especially in terms of attracting
funds to the capital scarce third world) or if in fact they add unnecessary instability to already
weak economies and tend to promote policies and outcomes detrimental to the poorest members
of those societies.  It is the latter view, as argued by Institutionalists (especially Ilene Grabel:
Grabel 1999, 1996a, 1996b, 1995a, and 1995b), that this paper will investigate.
The existing Institutionalist research is primarily theoretical or descriptive, with a handful
of  regression-based empirical studies.  My goal is to take these approaches to a new level by
combining and formalizing their insights in a system-dynamics model.  In particular, the impact
of deregulated capital markets on income distribution in Mexico will be highlighted.  Building
such a model will not only allow a more detailed and comprehensive view than results from a
regression analysis, but it permits some limited experiments by altering the historical inputs. 
This will, I hope, provide another avenue by which the current debate may be resolved.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, a brief survey of the work of
Institutionalist authors in this area is offered.  Next, system dynamics modeling is explained. 
The  model is then specified and some brief policy experiments are conducted.  Conclusions
follow.3
2Note that this is strikingly similar to what all economists, whether they be neoclassical,
Austrian, Marxist, Post Keynesian, or whatever, set forth as the goal for economic activity.  A
key difference is that Institutionalists do not believe that the extent to which a society utilizes
markets is a key question in this context.  One can have a market-driven economy in a society
that is dominated by instrumentality or ceremony.
1.  Mexico and the Institutionalist View of Economic Development: A Brief Introduction
One of the primary insights of the Institutionalist approach is that economic progress is a
function of the degree of social reliance on instrumental versus ceremonial valuing in guiding
behavior.  The former provides “the standards of judgment by which tools and skills are
employed in the application of evidentially warranted knowledge to the problem-solving
processes of the community” (Bush 1987, pp.1080).  Activities sanctioned by instrumentality are
those aimed at enhancing and extending the life processes of the general population.
2  The latter
offers justification “for invidious distinctions, which prescribe status, differential privileges, and
master-servant relationships” (Bush 1987, pp.1079).  Ceremonially-driven societies tend to
suppress technological advances in favor of tradition and privilege.  The argument goes that all
social institutions fall into one or the other category, and that those wherein instrumentality plays
the greater role are the ones most likely to generate socially useful outcomes.
Many Institutionalist authors have applied this tool to their analyses of economic
development.   Though it is difficult to generalize given the range of histories, cultures, et cetera,
there is nevertheless widespread evidence that developing economies are marked by a variety of
forms and manifestations of ceremonial valuing and invidious distinction.  To offer a quick
example, Dilmus James demonstrates that the context in which technology is adopted in
developing states is marked by “political myopia, inadequate incentive structures, and misguided4
attitudes”  (James 1995, p.155).  Rather than technology being a locus for community problem
solving, it has been perverted into a form of international conspicuous consumption for the
benefit of the local elites.  Scientific equipment is acquired, for example, not because it is
appropriate to address a particular domestic concern, but for the status it bestows on the
institution where it will be housed.  Land tenure in developing nations is another issue that has
been highlighted by Institutionalists (among others) as tending to promote class barriers over
social provisioning (and, therefore, ceremony over instrumentality).  Ethnic strife,  such a
hallmark of so many nations’ struggles, fits these characterizations as well.
That Mexico suffers from all these problems is hardly a shocking revelation.  Little real
attention is paid to developing technology, income distributions are grossly uneven, and the caste
system introduced by the colonial government still serves to separate the “haves” from the “have
nots” (Cockcroft 1998).  Economic activity is marked not by entrepreneurial attempts to meet the
demands of the common citizen, but instability, status seeking, and, on occasion, violence. 
Development in Mexico will require something much more fundamental than high rates of GDP
growth and moderate price inflation.
However, the focus of this paper is not so much these “indigenous” forms of ceremonial
valuing.  Many Institutionalists would argue that the market mythology of the West has
impressed itself upon the developing world and served to further strengthen the grip of elitism
and status seeking.  The spread of Western commercialism has taken place both via the insistence
of public and private international organizations (e.g., World Bank, IMF, and Citibank) and5
3As suggested in footnote one, Institutionalists do not view markets as good or bad, per
se.  Markets are simply a reflection of the rest of the culture.  As such, they can operate to
solidify the positions of elite classes over the peasantry, or as a catalyst for the marketing of safer
and more efficient household consumables.  Which is undertaken is a function of the structure of
the society in question–which in the case of the developing world is likely to be ceremonial. 
Hence Institutionalists’ hesitation to cheer the spread of free-market capitalism to the South.
through the voluntary (and self serving) adoption of those philosophies by local elites.
3
The most recent popular trend among developing economies has been liberalization of
capital markets as a means of attracting funds for development.  Grabel writes that the policy
makers of developing states prefer this option over borrowing from public international agencies
because:
Inflows of portfolio investment are seen to reflect investor confidence in the
ambitious programs of free-market reform implemented in many countries.
Inflows are also seen to be an important source of investment finance in
capital-scarce economies. Perhaps most appealing about portfolio investment is
that it seems to be free of the kinds of constraints on national policy sovereignty
that have traditionally been associated with direct investment, commercial bank
loans, or foreign aid flows (Grabel 1999, p.229).
But, of course, there are de facto constraints on national policy sovereignty.  At the most
basic level, developing states must create an atmosphere that appeals to international investors. 
While from the neoclassical perspective, this constraint might appear to be a perfectly reasonable
and, in fact, useful check on the economies of the third world, Grabel disagrees.  Not only, she
argues, will the dependence on the volatile international portfolio capital market add another
level of instability to the developing economy, but the constraints imposed–tight monetary6
policy, privatization, high currency values, political repression, and low wages, for example–tend
to contract economic activity and increase income inequality (Grabel 1999, pp.231-233).  Hence,
the cure may be worse than the disease.
The latter is precisely what this paper will investigate.  On the one hand, portfolio capital
flows do bring needed funding.  They serve to make available cash for private-sector activity,
government spending, and imports of needed technologies and raw materials.  Ceteris paribus,
that cannot be a bad thing.  However, Grabel (and other Institutionalists) argues that any benefit
that may be had from flows of short-term capital is more than offset by what is necessary to
attract it in the first place and the instability it then adds to an economy whose orientation is
already decidedly not instrumental in nature.  I intend to build a small model of the Mexican
economy and put Grabel’s contention to the test.
2. System Dynamics Modeling
In an appendix to An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal writes:
Ideally, the scientific solution of the Negro problem should thus be given in the
form of an interconnected series of quantitative equations, describing the
movement of the actual system under various influences.  That this complete,
quantitative and truly scientific solution is far beyond the horizon does not need to
be pointed out.  But in principle it is possible to execute, and it remains as the
scientific ideal steering our endeavors [Myrdal 1944, p.1069].
Needless to say, the era of computer technology means that Myrdal’s “scientific ideal” is
now a realistic possibility.  This is precisely the point Michael J. Radzicki makes in arguing for7
“Institutional Dynamics,” or a marriage of the parallel worlds of Institutionalism and system
dynamics computer modeling (Radzicki 1988).  The great virtue of this method is its ability to
take into account the holistic, systemic, and evolutionary character of economic activity and to
allow the researcher to capture the effects of qualitative as well as quantitative variables.  It
shows the operation of systems that exist in time and that are marked by feedback and cumulative
causation.  It further forces the researcher to add structure and substance to analyses that might
otherwise become “loose, uncontrolled speculation” (Wilber and Harrison 1978).
Employing system dynamics involves specifying the mathematical relationships among
the various objects deemed to be part of the system under study.  Some variables are determined
exogenously (as decided by the researcher), while others are created by the operation of the
model.  Based heavily on the work of Jay Forrester (see Radzicki 1988 for an extensive Forrester
bibliography), another expectation of those working with this method is that social systems tend
to be marked by feedback.  This, too, must be reflected in the model.  A number of software
packages have been designed for system dynamics modeling.  The model in this paper was built
using Powersim.
3. Modeling the Mexican Economy
3.1 Basic considerations
Radzicki and Sterman write that, above and beyond the final product itself (which can
never truly be final, given the evolutionary premises of the approach), the process of building a
system dynamics model is incredibly instructive and educational (Radzicki and Sterman, 1994). 
I can add my enthusiastic voice to theirs in this regard.  The model specification process was8
4The University of Texas Inequality Project makes available both their data and a series
of excellent papers (most featuring James K. Galbraith as a co-author) on their web site:
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/.  I are grateful to them for their kindness in forwarding these data.
indeed enlightening, not to mention terribly tedious!  The reader is spared much of the detail in
this regard, though justifications are offered where appropriate.
The first step was to determine the identity of the ultimate dependent variable.  Given the
Institutionalist approach to development, it clearly had to be some measure of the
ceremonial/instrumental dichotomy.  Based on Elliott and Harvey (2000), it was determined that
income inequality could serve as a proxy as it tends to be highly correlated (as both cause and
effect) with ceremonial activities like invidious distinction and conspicuous consumption.  In
practice, I used the Theil statistic (which rises as inequality increases) as created by the
University of Texas Inequality Project .
4  The great advantage of using their data was that they
were available over a much longer time period and with greater frequency than more standard
measures of inequality.
As one of the goals was to simulate a-historical policy packages, the next decision
concerned which variables should be manipulated in this regard.  Monetary and fiscal stances
were obvious choices.  I also hoped to show the impact of varying the minimum wage, exchange
rate, and market liberalization policies.  Precisely how each was modeled will be explained later.
With these variables identified, it remained to determine what economic processes
connected them.  My solution to this problem was informed by Post Keynesian macroeconomic
theory (though no works in particular).  The Post Keynesian approach is distinguished by, among
other things, the belief that agents make decisions in an environment of uncertainty and that
economic processes are best understood as existing in historical rather than mechanical time. 9
5Unless otherwise noted, all data were taken from the Bank of Mexico web site
(http://www.banxico.org.mx/) or that of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis FRED database
(http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/index.html).
The latter makes for an excellent fit with system dynamics, while the importance of the former is
in its implied rejection of Say’s Law and the consequent importance of financial markets in
playing significant role in determining “real” variables in the macroeconomy.
My final consideration was the detail with which I would model the processes between
income distribution and the policy variables.  My rule of thumb was to aim for simplicity while
highlighting those sub sectors in which I were particularly interested, i.e., portfolio capital flows
and the financial sector.
3.2 Estimating the model
While the final specification of a system dynamics model is the result of comparing the
plot of the endogenous variables (assuming the input of historical values for the exogenous
variables) with their historical counterparts and making adjustments to the parameters until
divergence is minimized, one must have an initial estimate with which to work.  To that end, I
ran a series of regressions based on my understanding of the operation of the Mexican
macroeconomy.  The study is quarterly 1980:2 through 1998:4 (both the endpoints and frequency
were dictated by data constraints).
The construction of the variables discussed hereafter should be evident from Table One
except for DFiscStim.
5  Because the government budget is as much determined by as it is a
determinant of economic activity, one cannot simply use the balance as evidence of fiscal policy. 
I attempted to net out of the raw numbers that part of the budget resulting from economic10
fluctuations (leaving the discretionary, or FiscStim; DSiscStim is the first difference).  To do
this, two regressions were run, one with government revenues dependent and industrial
production (a proxy for economic activity) independent and one with government spending
dependent and11
TABLE ONE: Variable Definitions and Sources (quarterly data from 1980:2 through
1998:4; all are for Mexico unless otherwise noted).
Variable Definition and Source (all Bank of Mexico unless noted)
Austerity Dummy to represent the introduction of de la Madrid’s austerity program.  Takes a value of
one for 1983:1.  Source: Author.
ChinaMRatio Ratio representing China’s share in total US imports.  Source: Author’s calculation using data
from FRED database and U.S. International Trade Commission.
Const Index of construction activity (1993=100).  DConst is first difference.
CVFX The monthly coefficient of variation of the monthly peso/$ exchange rate over the current
quarter.
DFI Net direct foreign investment (1000's of 1980 pesos).  It is first difference of DFK.
DFK Accumulated net direct foreign investment (1000's of 1980 pesos). Source: Author’s
calculation based on DFI numbers.  Source: Author’s calculation.
Exports Exports, 1000's of 1980 pesos.  DExports is first difference.
FinLib Dummy variable for government policy with respect to financial markets (default value of
zero; add one for privatized banking system (every quarter but 1982:4 through 1991:3), one
for deregulation involving credit rationing (1988:4 and thereafter), and one for legislative
efforts to make Mexican capital available to foreigners (1989:4)).  Source: Author.
FiscStim The  full employment budget surplus in millions of real pesos (equal to seasonally-adjusted
government spending minus government revenues plus 1.107 times IndProd).  Source:
Author’s calculations based on data from Bank of Mexico.  DFiscStim is first difference.
FX New Pesos per dollar.  DFX is first difference.
IndProd Index of industrial production (1993=100).  DIndProd is first difference.
Inf Consumer Price Inflation; DInf is first difference (note the latter also appears in the Powersim
model as D_Inf).
Int The nominal average cost of bank deposits.  DInt is the first difference.
LoanDefault Dummy to represent the announcement of Mexico’s loan default.  Takes a value of one for
1982:3.  Source: Author.
ManuWage Manufacturing wage index (1985=100, deflated using CPI).  DManuWage is the first
difference.
MinWage The minimum wage rate index (1978=100, deflated by CPI).  DMinWage is the first
difference.  MinWagePolicy is simply DMinWage–the latter could not be directly entered into
the model given Powersim’s restrictions.12
Overval Overvaluation of the peso. Based on purchasing power parity, it is calculated by subracting
the excess of Mexican inflation over US (CPI figures for both) from the quarter’s depreciation
of the peso.  Source: Author’s calculation using data from Bank of Mexico and FRED
database.
Pacto Dummy for the economic pact among government, labor, and business.  Takes a value of one
for 1988:2 through 1994:4.  DPacto is first difference.  Source: Author.
PFI Net portfolio foreign investment (1000's of 1980 pesos).  It is the first difference of PFK.
PFK Portfolio capital investment (1000's of 1980 pesos; accumulated net PFI). Source: Author’s
calculation based on PFI numbers.
Quake Dummy variable for 1985 earthquake (takes value of 0 except for 1985:4 through 1986:3). 
Source: Author.
RealInt The real (CPI deflated) average cost of bank deposits.  DRealInt is the first difference.  Note
that in the model presented RealInt acts only as a proxy for exogenous monetary policy.
RealOil Real dollar price of oil per barrel, measured in cents (1982-84 dollars).  DRealOil is first
difference.   Source: Author’s calculation using data from FRED database and U.S. Engergy
Information Administration, Department of Energy.
Theil Measures the variance of manufacturing wages and ranges from 0.004136 to 0.018691 (where
higher indicates greater inequality).  Source: University of Texas Inequality Project.
TradeLib Dummy to represent trade liberalization policies.  Takes a value of one for 1988:1 through
1998:4.  Source: Author.
USECI US Employment Cost Index.  DUSECI is first difference.  Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor.
USGDP US GDP, seasonally adjusted, billions of 1996 dollars.  DUSGDP is first difference.  Source:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
USInf US Consumer Price Inflation.  Source: FRED database.
USInt US Fed Funds Rate adjusted for inflation (using CPI).  Source: FRED database.
XIndex Variable proxying the importance of the foreign trade sector to the economy.  Measured as the
ratio of exports (1000's of 1980 pesos) to industrial production (1993=100).  Source: Author’s
calculation using Bank of Mexico data.13
6Note that the intercepts of the estimated equations were not used in the calculation.  This
was both because intercept estimates are not terribly reliable and FiscStim actually employed in
the differenced form,  DFiscStim.  Hence, the constants would be irrelevant.
industrial production independent (monthly 1980 through 1998; because I was less limited, I used
a longer time period and more frequent observations in the hope that this would result in a more
accurate estimate).  Those results are shown below (the technique is ordginary least squares;
parenthetical numbers are absolute values of t-statistics; these conventions are followed through
the rest of the paper):
(1) Spending = 186 - .838IndProd adj-R
2 = 0.28
    (9.38)
(2) Revenue = 14 + .269IndProd adj-R
2 = 0.31
    (10.00)
Spending and Revenue were drawn from the Bank of Mexico web site and were measured in
millions of 1980 pesos, and IndProd was as shown in Table 1.  As expected, government
spending declines in response to rises in economic activity, while revenues increase.
To remove the cyclical component from the government’s excess of spending over
revenue, the following calculation was made:
FiscStim = (Spending - Revenue) - (-0.838IndProd) + 0.269IndProd, or, 
FiscStim = (Spending - Revenue) + 1.107IndProd
where FiscStim is the adjusted fiscal stimulus.
6
Estimation then began with the ultimate dependent variable: Theil (recall that the Theil
will rise as inequality increases).  I theorized that it would be a function of the overall level of
manufacturing wages (a hypothesis consistent with the findings of Galbraith, Conceição, and
Kum (2000)), the 1985 earthquake, and the Mexican government’s financial market14
liberalization policy.  The following equation was estimated:
(3) Theil = 0.024375 - 0.001848ManuWage + 0.002675FinLib + 0.001247Quake  
                   (14.04)               (18.11)            (1.45)
adj-R
2 = 0.86
As expected, rising wages was associated with declining income inequality, while the earthquake
and market liberalization led to increases.  The last is included here on the assumption that (as
Grabel argues) simultaneous with  moves to make it easier for foreigners to enter their capital
market, the Mexican government adopted labor policies that were likely to be attractive to
foreign investors and that would not have already been reflected in wages.   All variables were
significant at the ten-percent level.
Moving backwards from here, as both FinLib and Quake are exogenous this leaves only
ManuWage to explain.  Here, I assumed the primary determinants of wages would be the level of
economic activity (IndProd), the minimum wage (MinWage; it is an especially important
benchmark in the Mexican economy), the pact made among workers, government, and labor
(Pacto), the de la Madrid austerity program (Austerity), and the changing structure of
employment.  To capture the latter I used two interaction terms.  The first, DFK*TradeLib,
hypothesizes that the open courting of foreign direct capital associated with the liberalization
policies that began around 1988 led to rising wages for those Mexicans employed by foreign
multinationals (through the Maquiladoras, for example).  The second, Xindex*TradeLib, draws
on the results of the 2002 UNCTAD Trade and Development Report (UNCTAD 2002), wherein
it is argued that developing nations experiencing growing export sectors witness a decline in
overall wages.  This is so, they suggest, because it appears that the exports that grow tend
overwhelmingly to be those involved with labor-intensive manufactures, often as a single stage15
of an internationalized production process.  Not only does this already tend to be a low-wage
occupation, developing states are increasingly competing for this business and thereby managine
to drive wages even lower.
(4) DManuWage = -0.038 + 0.055DIndProd + 0.248*Pacto +
                                                  (1.92)                   (3.03)
 .00000039(DFK*TradeLib) + 0.029DMinWage(-1) -
                (1.56)                                           (4.79)
 5.45(XIndex*TradeLib) - 0.766*Austerity
             (1.95)                              (2.27)
adj-R
2 = 0.41
All variables were signficant at the ten-percent level.
Three of the determinants in equation (4) are endogenous: IndProd, DFK, and XIndex. 
Dealing initially with the first, it was easier to explain differences in IndProd than the level (the
latter can then be built from the successive changes–this is simple to do in Powersim).  In
specifying equation (5), I assumed as my base a standard demand-driven macroeconomic model
in which economic activity is a function of the autonomous spending associated with the fiscal
stimulus (DFiscStim), private investment (for which I used construction activity as a proxy:
Dconst), and exports (Dexports).  I further decided, not only here but in the rest of the model, to
measure all non-financial variables in real terms.  This does not imply,  however, that I assume
money to be a veil in my system.  Rather, monetary factors are vitally important and will tend to
spur additional economic activity when financial markets are stable and dampen it when they are
volatile.  As stock market figures were available for only a small subset of my time series I opted
to use the monthly coefficient of variation of the peso-dollar exchange rate over the current16
quarter (CVFX) as a proxy for financial market volatility and to then include this directly in the
regression.  This yielded the estimate below:
(5) DIndProd = 0.268182  + 0.064DFiscStim + 0.302DConst + 0.936DExports - 4.57CVFX
                                                         (3.96)                (4.81)                  (2.64)               (1.73)
adj-R
2 = 0.47
Again, all variables were signficant at the ten-percent level.
DFI was estimated using equation (6) (which can then be used to create DFK).  Unlike
domestic physical investment DFI is less likely to depend on local financing and thus not need
high levels of PFI or low interest rates.  Since so much Mexican DFI comes from the United
States, I included changes in U.S. GDP (since, from a vertical DFI perspective, U.S. firms may
be expected to be expanding when their economy is booming; horizontal DFI may also be
positively correlated with U.S. GDP since a rise in the latter is likely to create a locomotive effect
with respect to the Mexican economy).  Second, I include DFX, since a falling peso would be
attractive to U.S. firms.  Third, I assumed that government attitudes toward market liberalization
(especially as it affects rules governing foreign ownership) would play an important role. 
Finally, Mexican wages are bound to have an impact on the DFI decision.  My result is shown
below:
(6) DFI = 8063 + 54.7DUSGDP + 4980FinLib(-1) + 9914DFX(-1) - 3499DManuWage(-1)
                                         (2.10)             (5.39)              (2.65)                  (1.22)
adj-R
2 = 0.41
All variables are significant at the ten-percent level.  Note that three of the variables are lagged
one period, as indicated by the “(-1)” (a (-2) represents a two-quarter lag, and so on).   This and
all subsequent lags were a function of empirical fit rather than theory alone.17
The last remaining endogenous variable from equation (4) is XIndex, the ratio of exports
to industrial production in Mexico.  As the latter has already been explained, it remains to specify
the former, which I do in (7) (which shows change rather than level; again, the latter is easily
constructed from the former in Powersim):
(7) DExports = 0.42 + 0.76DFX - 0.403(Inf(-1)-USInf(-1)) +
                                        (8.05)         (3.03)
0.148DUSECI(-1) - 0.0436DManuWage(-2) - 0.110TradeLib +
           (1.55)                        (1.41)                             (1.38)
0.000144DRealOil - 35.41(ChinaMRatio) + 0.8443*(DUSGDP/USGDP)
           (1.07)                       (1.60)                          (0.18)
adj-R
2 = 0.50
This one became rather complex, with eight determinants.  To take account of price factors I
included both DFX and the difference between U.S. and Mexican inflation.  I then took separate
account of the difference between U.S. and Mexican wages with USECI and DManuWage.  The
regression was rounded out with variables representing Mexican relaxation of trade restrictions
(TradeLib), the price of oil (on which Mexican export revenues had been dependent), U.S. GDP
growth (as an income variable), and the ratio of U.S. imports from China.  I added the last to take
into account the fact that in the latter part of the time period under study the U.S. began to import
more and more low-cost goods from China, rather than traditional sources like Mexico.  All
variables were significant at the ten-percent level except oil prices and U.S. GDP growth.
Left unexplained from equation (5) are DConst and CVFX.  Dealing with the latter first, I
hypothesized that volatility was in part a positive function of the level of foreign portfolio capital
investment in Mexico (PFK) and of price inflation (Inf).  The latter would contribute rather18
directly to financial instability as it forces re-evaluation of asset prices, while the former, as it
rises, increases the level of speculative activity in the market.  On the other hand, increasing
industrial activity is likely to promote stability.  Exchange rate overvaluation (measured by
Overval, which I found worked better when squared–a result that is also intuitively appealing)
and the announcement of Mexico’s default in 1982 were also assumed to affect exchange rate
volatility.  I estimated the below (all variables significant at the ten-percent level):
(8) CVFX = -0.095 - 0.0059DIndProd(-1) + .0000000142PFK +
                                        (1.83)                              (1.15)
0.154Inf + 0.0989Overval
2 + 0.087LoanDefault
           (4.70)                  (2.96)                 (2.28)
adj-R
2 = 0.35
Modeling construction activity proved somewhat more complicated.  I assumed that
interest rates (nominal) would be an important consideration, along with foreign portfolio
investment (which should make availability of funds greater) and foreign direct investment
(which will directly contribute to construction in many cases).  The trickiest problem, however,
was determining a variable that could be used to proxy market confidence (something akin to
Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital).  Though I found no such direct measure in existence, I
wase able to use the change in the peso-dollar exchange rate and its volatility as proxies (the
logic being that a strong peso and low volatility, i.e., falling or small values for DFX and CVFX,
would suggest a sound Mexican economy in which to invest).  I also added DFiscStim to
represent the Mexican government’s impact on investment spending, assuming that some of the
activity would have been construction.  The following regression was estimated:19
(9) DConst = 0.607 + .0000196PFI(-1) - 0.076DInt(-1) - 4.65DFX + 
                                           (1.49)                 (1.57)               (2.73)
.0000278DFI + 0.23DFiscStim - 22.27CVFX
             (0.69)             (5.05)                  (2.08)
adj-R
2 = 0.40
All variables were significant at the ten-percent level except DFI.
Equations (8) and (9) contain six endogenous variables (DIndProd, PFK, Inf, PFI, DInt,
and DFI), one of which has already been explained (DIndProd, in equation (5)).  PFK is defined
in the dynamic model simply as an initial value plus PFI.  Thus, it is only the latter that must be
explained here.  I theorized that foreign portfolio investment would be driven by four major
factors: government liberalization policies (FinLib), financial market volatility (CVFX), the
proxy for confidence (DFX; recall that a positive value indicates declining confidence), the
excess interest return available on Mexican assets, the Pacto, and industrial production.  I
expected FinLib to be positively related as the international investment community would
interpret liberalization in a positive light (squaring the term gave a better result); CVFX to be
negative, as financial instability caused capital flight; DFX to be negative, as peso depreciations
would also lead to capital flight; the excess return on Mexican assets to be positive; the Pacto to
be positive as it helped drastically reduce inflation and encourage foreign confidence in the
Mexican economy; and industrial production to be positive as it indicated a stronger Mexico. 
Equation (10) shows the results:20
(10) PFI = -2657 + 4097FinLib
2 - 149181CVFX - 63913DFX + 175(Int-USInt) +
                                  (3.62)         (1.89)              (5.27)            (0.95)
12972Pacto + 4916DIndProd
            (1.66)           (1.95)
adj-R
2 = 0.88
All are significant with the exception of Interest-USInterest, which does have the correct sign.
Like PFK, inflation is defined in the dynamic model as an initial value plus cumulative
changes.  The latter is expressed as DInf, or the rate of change of the CPI differenced over
quarters.  Assuming both a cost-push and policy element to inflation in Mexico, I modeled it as a
function of wages (ManuWage) and the change in real interest rates (DrealInt; this variable enters
into the model only as a proxy Mexican central bank policy and is therefore exogenous and not a
function of any internal processes).  In addition, Pacto was clearly an important policy
determinant of inflation, and the rate of peso depreciation (DFX/FX) would contribute to higher
prices.  All variables were significant at the ten-percent level:
(11) DInf =  -0.089 + 0.0066ManuWage - 0.0083DRealInt + 0.511(DFX/FX) - 0.634DPacto -
                                      (1.41)                      (13.80)                 (6.69)                  (10.66)
adj-R
2 = 0.88
Changes in nominal interest were assumed to be a function of domestic inflation and
inflows of foreign investment (with the former expected to raise nominal interest and the latter to
lower it):
(12) DInt = 0.379254 - .0000171PFI + 43.55742DInf
                                               (0.78)              (8.00)
adj-R
2 = 0.48
DInf is significant; PFI is not, but the coefficient has the correct sign.21
Finally, peso overvaluation was calculated as follows (based on the purchasing power
parity equation):
(13) Overval = DFX/FX-Inf+USInf.
3.3 Finalizing the system dynamics model
The first Powersim model consisted of equations (3) through (13).  Further tweaking of
the relationships then took place.  In general, because I found that the real world tended to be
more unstable than my model, a few intercepts had to be shifted and more volatility was added. 
Also, a frequent problem during final specification was the explosiveness caused by the
numerous feedback effects.  Altering a variable coefficient by only a small amount sometimes led
to surprisingly large cumulative changes in the model.  Many of these took considerable time to
trace and solve.
In the end, the model consisted of forty-two variables (eighteen exogenous and twenty-
four endogenous, including eight sets of flows into stocks) and eleven equations (excluding the
stock-flow relationships), using quarterly observations.  The core relationships are defined in
Appendix One.  These combine to create the system shown in Diagram One.
As suggested above, the first test of any such model is how well recreates the past. 
Diagram Two shows the result of inputting historical values for the exogenous variables.  It
appears to have a reasonable fit over the time period.
The next step is to posit ahistorical policy choices and then compare that Theil plot with22
Diagram 1: Complete Powersim Model.23
7That is, all comparisons of a-historical plots are made against the simulation shown in
Diagram One, not against the historical Theil.
Diagram 2: The model simulation (Theil) versus the historical plot (Hist_Theil).
the original forecast.
7  This is done in below, where alternate minimum wage, monetary policy,
and fiscal policy, and capital market and trade liberalization policy regimes are explored. 
Interestingly, the story told by Grabel is only partially supported.  
Before beginning the series of policy experiments, it should be said that one has to be
very careful changing the values too far from their historical levels.  While a dynamic model such
as that presented here is better equipped to adapt to a-historical scenarios, it is still ultimately
limited by the fact that it was built by comparing simulation results to actual events in 1980 to
1998 Mexico.  Hence, suddenly quintupling the fiscal policy stimulus would not only be difficult
to justify in terms of financing, but it would lie so far beyond the range of the data used to build
the model that any results would be suspect.  Nevertheless, it is desirable to try combinations that24
Diagram 3: The impact of higher minimum wages (New_Theil) versus the simulation
using historical wage values (Sim_Theil).
did not occur in reality; but the researcher must try to limit the experiments to situations that
might have been possible in reality, and both reader and researcher must be careful in interpreting
subsequent plots.
Diagram Three shows the impact of holding the minimum wage at the 1980:2 level (the
first observation; in reality it fell, in real terms, rather steadily from an index value of 126 in
1980:2 to 38 in 1998:4).  The result is striking.  Though the Theil is still higher than it was at the
beginning of the time period, it is a vast improvement over the simulation in which the minimum
wage is allowed to collapse.  Of course, part of the reason is the fact that the minimum wage
impacts on the manufacturing wage, which, feeds directly into the Theil.  Higher wages decrease
income inequality.  But there are negative effects, too.  Higher wages lead to higher inflation and
greater financial market instability (via CVFX).  Still, this appears to be minor.  Inflation
averages 41% when the minimum wage is not allowed to fall, as opposed to 32% when it is. 25
8This differs from the previous scenario in that minimum wages were not set to levels that
had never been experienced–they simply were not changed.
Diagram 4: The impact of 100% greater fiscal stimulus (New_Theil) versus the
simulation using historical fiscal policy values (Sim_Theil).
Apparently, that is insufficient to cause a significant decline in industrial production (which
would have then lowered wages).  Interestingly, foreign direct investment is completely
unaffected, so the higher wages do not seem to discourage multinationals.  Exports do fall, but
this turns out to be a positive since it lowers the export ratio (and hence employment in the
increasingly low-wage export sector).
Diagram 4 posits a fiscal policy stance 100% more expansionary than in reality.  The
reader might rightfully object that it is difficult to imagine Mexico being able to finance such a
deficit; however, my only goal in showing this level is to make it plain how little help a
traditional macro stimulus is under such circumstances.
8  The difference can be traced to the fact
that the XIndex does not rise as rapidly as it did in reality (due to the inflation created by the26
Diagram 5: The impact of 6% lower real interest rates (New_Theil) versus the simulation
using historical real interest rate values (Sim_Theil).
higher wages), thus helping overall income equality.  But again, the real lesson here is that fiscal
policy changes (at least in terms of the general level of spending) would not be helpful to
Mexico.
Nor can much be achieved by monetary policy, as shown in Diagram 5.  This shows a six
percent lower real interest rate (which averaged 4.5%, but ranged from 34.6% to -41.0% over the
period studied), which represents a pretty significant effort on the part of the Mexican central
bank.  Again, the plot appears to be attributable to lower exports.  As with fiscal policy, the
overall impact on income inequality is rather small given the exertion necessary.
Diagram 6 takes us finally to the question at hand: does capital market liberalization hurt
more than it helps?  The answer for Mexico is very interesting.  At first the no-capital-
liberalization Theil is superior (1980:2 through 1982:4, or observations 1 through 11).  After that,
it is practically (though not exactly) identical to the historically-based simulation until 1989:127
Diagram 6: The impact of no capital market liberalization (New_Theil) versus the
simulation using historical capital market liberalization values (Sim_Theil).
(observation 36), when it again falls below the latter.  Thus far, this would not be inconsistent 
with the arguments forwarded by Grabel.  However, in 1994:3 (observation 58), the slope of the
Theil shifts from negative to positive.  The historically-based Theil does the same around this
time, but its slope is smaller.  Hence, in 1997:1 (observation 68), the new Theil crosses above the
other, and appears to be well on its way to even higher levels as the time period ends.  This does
not fit with Grabel’s hypothesis.
What appears to happen is the following.  First, as one would expect, portfolio capital
inflows fall steadily behind the historically-based simulation level, as does direct foreign
investment.  Though inflation and financial market volatility are lower, industrial production is,
too.  The last occurs primarily because construction activity is off (given the fall in portfolio
investment funds available and the lack of direct foreign investment).  Meanwhile, Mexican trade28
Diagram 7: The impact of no trade liberalization (New_Theil) versus the simulation
using historical trade liberalization values (Sim_Theil).
liberalization goes on as planned in 1988:1 (observation 32), and exports are further boosted by
the lower level of Mexican inflation and a slightly cheaper peso (both again due to the lack of
inward portfolio investment).  The key to understanding this scenario–and a factor not taken into
account by Grabel–is the subsequent rise in the ratio of the rising exports to the falling industrial
production.  As suggested before, it has been argued that export sectors in developing countries
are increasingly in competition with one another for simple, repetitive manufacturing jobs that
low-skilled, low-waged labor can undertake.  In the model used here, the lasting impact of the
lack of capital market liberalization was a shift in Mexico’s employment structure towards such
jobs.
This raises the question of what might have happened had the trade liberalization not
taken place in 1988:1 (observation 32).  Diagram 7 illustrates this scenario.  Now, there is a large
and dramatic decline in income inequality in Mexico, one that is due almost entirely to the29
subsequent rise in manufacturing wages.  Inflation and financial volatility are slightly higher, and
direct foreign investment is lower, but the overall impact is still very clear–trade liberalization
and the subsequent acceptance on Mexico’s part of low-wage employment in that sector was a
major factor in increased income inequality.  Liberalization of capital flows were not.
4. Conclusions
Grabel’s premise is that more harm than good is done when developing states decide to
depend on portfolio investment flows for funding.  As I suggested above, however, whether or
not this conclusion is valid is an empirical question.  More inflows of short-term capital cannot,
ceteris paribus, be entirely bad.  And yet the conditions that attract and are then created by such
flows can be argued to have a negative impact on the host.  But which effect is greater?
My conclusion is that the results are mixed, though there are compelling reasons to
believe that Grabel is right.  For Mexico over the time period studied, resisting capital market
liberalization did for a time result in higher wages, more equal distributions of income, and
(presumably) a shift toward instrumental valuing.  However, once the export sector growth
accelerated, all gains were lost, and then some.  The question is whether this is a function of
Grabel’s original argument being flawed, or of ceteris paribus being violated.
I strongly suspect the latter.  If we assume that the UNCTAD report is, indeed, correct in
arguing that developing states with rising export sectors have been suffering due to competition
for the limited number of low-wage manufacturing jobs available (UNCTAD 2002), then this
goes a long way toward explaining the apparent failure of Grabel’s hypothesis.  Recall that the
rising Theil in Diagram 6 was a function of the rising export ratio.  Note that even with that30
9The reader may wonder if I tried suspending both the trade and capital market
liberalizations.  I did, and found that under those circumstances Grabel’s hypothesis came
through loud and clear.  I hesitate to present this result, however, as it violates my earlier warning
against trying to change too much history in running the simulation.  It is nevertheless instructive
and consistent with what I conclude.
negative taken into account, income inequality in Mexico was lower or equal to the historically-
based simulation for all but the last two years of the period studied.  Hence, until 1997:1, even
fighting against the declining wages of the rising export sector, the Mexican economy’s
performance was superior when there was no capital market liberalization.  Grabel is vindicated.
9
Still, I think the model constructed here suggests that there is a new and important factor
that Institutionalist development economists must take into account (above and beyond
indigenous issues and those suggested by Grabel).  Though it would be wrong to say that they are
unaware of the trends in export-sector wages, the size of the impact of the latter is surprising and
noteworthy.  At present and in the specific case of Mexico, it appears to be a more important
explanation of income mal-distribution than capital market liberalization.31
APPENDIX ONE
The following is a complete list of the final equations used in the model, shown in Powersim’s
format.  The following is a key to the labels before each:
init = initialization value;
flow = subsequent changes over each time period (i.e., each dt, or delta time);
aux = auxiliary equation;
const = constant (note that these were not actually constant, but input via data files; the values
shown for the constants are never read by the computer as it knows to retrieve them instead from
the file).
init DFK = 19721.15
flow DFK = +dt*DFI
init Exports = 3.75
flow Exports = +dt*DExports
init FX = 0.022867
flow FX = +dt*DFX
init IndProd = 76.6
flow IndProd = +dt*DIndProd
init Inf = .125
flow Inf = +dt*D_Inf
init Interest = 20.23
flow Interest = +dt*DInt
init ManuWage = 11.35576
flow ManuWage = +dt*DManuWage
init MinWage = 125.73
flow MinWage = +dt*DMinWage
init PFK = 52271.586
flow PFK = +dt*PFI
aux D_Inf = 1*DInf32
aux DExports =  0.4236179426 + 0.7616161866*DFX -0.4028612835*(DELAYMTR(Inf,
1,1,0)-DELAYMTR(USInf, 1,1,0)) + 0.1482662199*DELAYMTR(DUSECI, 1,1,0) -
0.04381232339*DELAYMTR(DManuWage, 1,2,0) - 0.009675869*TradeLib +
0.0001444786677*DRealOil - 30.41167165*ChinaMRatio +
0.8443237062*(DUSGDP/USGDP)
aux DFI = 8063.768+54.7457*DUSGDP-3499.1148*DELAYMTR(DManuWage, 1, 1,
0)+4980.575*DELAYMTR(FinLib,1,1,0)+9914.533*DELAYMTR(DFX,1,1,0)
aux DFX = FX_Policy*1
aux DIndProd =
0.1+0.06369*DFiscStim+0.30217*DConst+0.936528*DExports-4.571321*LIMIT(CVFX, 0, 1)
aux DInt = 0.37925-0.0000171403*PFI+43.55742*D_Inf
aux DManuWage =  -0.03768057989 +0.05455861834*DIndProd + 0.3083453584*Pacto +
.0000003873459374*(DFK*TradeLib) + 0.02934270885*DELAYMTR(DMinWage, 1,1,0) -
6*(XIndex*TradeLib) - 1.5*Austerity
aux DMinWage = MinWagePolicy*1
aux PFI =  -10000 + 4097.306846*(FinLib^2) - 149181.374*LIMIT(CVFX, 0, 1) -
63913.21274*DFX + 175.3751198*(Interest-USInt) + 12972.44262*Pacto +
4916.133139*DIndProd
aux CVFX =  -0.09458801835 - 0.005922252437*DELAYMTR(DIndProd, 1,1,0) +
.00000001424783587*PFK + 0.1539076644*Inf +
0.09891146129*(Overval^2)+0.08667137399*LoanDefault
aux DConst = 0.6071011852+
.00001958030106*DELAYMTR(PFI,1,1,0)-0.07562*DELAYMTR(DInt, 1,1,0)-4.65009*DFX
+0.000027847*DFI+0.2299829782*DFiscStim-22.27025905*LIMIT(CVFX, 0, 1)
aux DInf = 0.002*ManuWage- 0.008325*DRealInt+0.1*DFX/FX-0.6*DPacto-.05*Pacto
aux Overval = DFX/FX-Inf+USInf
aux Theil = 0.02437-0.00185*ManuWage+0.00267*FinLib+0.001247*Quake
aux XIndex = Exports/IndProd
const Austerity = 333
const ChinaMRatio = 2
const DFiscStim = 2.25255
const DPacto = 0
const DRealInt = 6.554090949
const DRealOil = 200.278
const DUSECI = 2
const DUSGDP = 12
const FinLib = 1
const FX_Policy = 0.00006667
const LoanDefault = 3
const MinWagePolicy = 125.7298
const Pacto = 0
const Quake = 0
const TradeLib = 0
const USGDP = 0.0020615
const USInf = 2
const USInt = 534
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